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ANNOUNCEMENT
THE REVIEW announces with regret the resignation of Louis
Gorrin from the office of Note Editor. At the same time it takes
pleasure in announcing the election of Meyer L. Girsh to that office,
and the election of Andrew J. Schroder, II, to the office of Book
Review Editor, recently vacated by Mr. Girsh.
THE REvIEw also takes pleasure in announcing the election to
the Editorial Board of the following members of the Third Year
Class: George M. Brodhead, Jr., Milton Gould, Benjamin R. Jones,
Jr., Walter N. Moldawer and Hyman Zuckerman.
NOTES.
LIMITATION OF SHIPOWNERS' LIABILITY IN AMERICAN COURTS
-The problem of the limitation of a shipowner's liability for
damage to property or loss of life in marine disaster arising from
collision or other negligent act or omission wherein subjects of for-
eign nations are involved, may be approached from the viewpoint
of either statutory construction or conflict of laws. The ratio de-
cidendi of the adjudicated cases-those that do lay down a definite
rule of law-does not always rest on a genuinely legal or logical basis.
The decisions in English and American courts until recently have
been in conflict, even in the courts of the same jurisdiction.
The avowed purpose of the United States statutes' limiting the
liability of shipowners for losses sustained without such shipowner's
privity or knowledge, to the extent of his interest in the vessel and
freight then pending, is the protection of United States shipowners
in competition with foreign shippers." By the law administered in
admiralty prior to these enactments, i. e., the "general maritime
law," there was no such doctrine of limitation of liability in this
country.3 The effect of these statutes is to limit, in certain cases,
an owner's liability for tortious acts to the value of his interest in
the ship, providing he surrenders his ship, or transfers it to trustees
for the benefit of claimants. 4 The purpose and the effect of the acts
combine either to limit the doctrine of respondeat suprior, a funda-
mental concept both of the common law and the general maritime
law, or totally to displace it with another liability. What principle
of conflict of law is to be applied in a given case depends upon which
"Act of March 3, 1851, C. 43, § I, 9 SlrAT. 635, 46 U. S. C. § 182; Act of
Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, § I, 27 STAT. 445, 46 U. S. C. § 19o.
223 CONG. GLOBE 713 (1851) ; Norwich v. Wright, 8I U. S. 104, 121 (1871).
3 The Rebecca, i Ware 187 (D. C. D. Me. 1831).
'46 U. S. C. § 182. (393)
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theory, limitation or displacement, is considered the result of these
acts.
In England today the dispute as to which theory is to be applied
is of mere academic importance inasmuch as the English limited
liability statutes 5 since 1894 have expressly provided that their
terms shall extend to all cases of collision or other disaster, irre-
spective of whether the shipowner seeking limited liability is British
or foreign. But in the American courts, it is of more than mere
theoretical interest, and in order to lay a foundation in reason for
correct theoretical application, it is well to consider the prevailing
conflict of laws doctrines and their application to these cases.
It is generally admitted that actions for personal torts are tran-
sitory and may be brought wherever service can be made upon the
tort feasor.6 However, the existence of liability is dependent on the
substantive law where the act takes place.7 Under that law it is to
be determined whether a right with its correlative obligation has been
created by the act.8 Procedural matters, or matters of remedy, not
pertaining to the substance of the right, are to be determined by the
law of the forumY If, then, limitation of liability is a matter purely
of remedy, the statutes limiting liability, not making any distinction
in terms between American and foreign-owned bottoms, must be
applied in all cases tried in our courts regardless of the place of
injury or the registry of the ship. If it is a matter of substance, then
the lex loci delicti becomes the deciding factor.
In one of the earliest cases wherein the conflict of laws problem
was discussed, a collision occurred on the high seas between a Brit-
ish and a Norwegian vessel, due to the negligent navigation of the
former. The owner of the British vessel, being libelled in the United
States District Court, petitioned for limited liability under the United
States statute.1 The district court held that a British shipowner
could not obtain the benefit of the statute because "that statute con-
tains no language that will admit of the supposition that it was in-
'MERCHANT SHIPPING ACT 57 & 58 Vicr. c. 6o s. 503 (1851) ; 1894 s. 503;
19o6 s. 69; 1907 s. i.
'Slater v. Mexican National R. R. Co., 194 U. S. 120, 24 Sup. Ct. 58I
(9o3) ; Herrick v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 31 Minn. iI, 16 N. W. 413
(1884); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99, 12o N. E. 198 (1918);
GOODRIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 194.
'BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1916) 157: "What acts are forbidden, so
that their commission constitutes a tort, what use of property is permitted, are
questions which concern only the sovereign within whose dominion the acts
are proposed. What is a tort, . . . what civil rights a person may exercise,
are all determined by the law of the place where the alleged rights are to be
exercised."
8 Slater v. Mex. Nat. R. R. Co.; Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., both supra
note 6.
' GODRICH, op. ct. supra note 6, 158 et seq.
20 46 U. S. C. 182, supra note I.
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tended to apply to foreigners out of the jurisdiction." 11 However, the
court would not apply either the law of Norway or England, for "no
good reason can be given for resorting to the law of one of these na-
tions rather than the other," 12 but applied the "law of the place where
he incurred the obligation, . .. the high seas." The reasoning of the
court presupposes that limitation of liability is not merely a proced-
ural limitation on the doctrine of respondeat superior, but an abso-
lute right in the nature of a defense to the application of the doc-
trine. If this is true, the court's application of the lex loci delicti
is correct, assuming the high seas to be a jurisdiction governed by the
lex mnaris. Most courts speak of the sea as regio aullius or regio
cormunis with a "universal law of the sea." But, in The Lotto-
wanna 13 the Supreme Court recognizes that the general maritime
law is the law of the sea as administered in each country by its
courts. The court then applied the "general maritime law" and not
the statute invoked by the respondent. And yet, in The Lottowanna,
in laying down the rule for ascertaining the maritime law of this
country, the court said "we must have regard to our own legal his-
tory, constitution, legislation, usages and adjudications as well." This,
and Thomassen v. Whitwell, recognize that a general body of law
did grow up, similar, to a great degree, in most countries, but dif-
fering in many aspects. Therefore, "general maritime law" means
nothing, and the lex fori becomes substituted for the lexi loci, subject
to whatever limitations the forum chooses to put upon it.""
In The Scotland,' a case of collision between an American and
a British ship, on the high seas, the Supreme Court held that the
British owners might take advantage of our limited liability statute.
The rule of the decision was that where "the contesting vessels
belonged to the same foreign nation, the court would assume that they
were subject to the law of their nation carried under their common
flag, and would determine the controversy accordingly." The Court
assumes that limitation of liability is a right, not merely a remedy,
n Thomassen v. Whitwell, 9 Ben. 403 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1878).
32Ibid. 4o6.
" 89 U. S. 558, 573 (1874). "But it is hardly necessary to argue that the
maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by
the laws and usages of that country . . . it can only so far have the effect
of law in any country as it is permitted to have. No one doubts that every
nation may adopt its own maritime code. Thus adopted and thus qualified in
each case, it becomes the maritime law of the particular nation that adopts it.
And without such voluntary adoption it would not be law." BENEDicT, AD-
IAIRALTY ( 4th ed. ,") 3, defines "maritime law": ". general rules, as
the Law of the Sea, to which all submitted as to a sort of maritime law of
nations. This is now called the general maritime law, and sometimes the
admiralty law . . . But it should be borne in mind that this general mari-
time law may be subject to change in different countries," citing The Lotto-
wanna, sujpra.
"The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24 (1881). The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355, 5
Sup. Ct. 860 (885) ; La Bourgogne, 210 U. S. 95, 28 Sup. Ct. 664 (1907).
"The Scotland, supra note 14.
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when it admits that if the colliding ships are of one nationality, that
nation's law would govern. The only theory that can justify this
conclusion is that the whole occurrence was consummated on the
"floating territory" of that State--"the law of the flag" being the
lex loci deliciti commissi ' 8 -and that the substantive law of that
nation, governing the territory of both ships, would apply. This
would be good conflict of laws doctrine. However, in this case, the
injury was done on board an American ship which is part of the float-
ing territory of the United States and subject to the laws of the
United States." Therefore, the limited liability statute should apply
of right, 8 without regard to the fact that the wrongdoing vessel was
not an American ship.
The rule of The Scotland was directly applied in re Leonard,
et al.,19 in a situation where its application would injure the foreign
owners, by limiting the liability of an American vessel which had
collided with a British vessel on the high seas.
The principle was reaffirmed in The Belgenland,20 which was the
case of a collision on the high seas between the Belgian steamer,
Belgenland, and the Norwegian barque, Lina, which was sunk. Mr.
Justice Bradley, who delivered the opinion in The Scotland, said,2 '
"if the maritime law as administered by both nations to which the
respective ships belong, be the same in both in respect to any matter
of liability or obligation, such law, if shown to the court, should be
followed in that matter in respect to which they so agree, though it
"' McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546, 553 (1879): ". • . for matters
occurring at sea the vessel must be regarded as part of the territory of the
State." In Crapo v. Kelly, 84 U. S. 61o, 624 (1872), which involved an assign-
ment made on board a ship of Massachusetts registry, the court said, "We are
of the opinion, for the purpose we are considering, that the ship Arctic was
a portion of the territory of Massachusetts." International Nav. Co. v. Lind-
strom, 123 Fed. 475 (C. C. A. 2d, 1903); Vicomte etc., v. So. Pac. Co., 176
Fed. 843 (C. C. A. Ist, 191o) ; Regina v. Keyn, 2 Ex. D. 63 (1876) ; WHARTON,
CON Icr OF LAWS (3d ed. i9o5) § 48o6; MINOR, CONFLICr OF LAws (i9i)
§ 195; CALVO, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, (5th ed. 1896) § 72.
" See cases cited supra note I6.
' Slater v. Mex. Nat. R. R. Co., supra note 6. at 126, 24 Sup. Ct. at 582:
"The theory . . . is that, although the act complained of was subject to
no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation . . . which,
like other obligations, follows the person and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found. But as the only source of this obligation is the law of
the place of the act, it follows that the law determines not merely the existence
of the obligation, but equally determines its extent." Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co., supra, note 6, at io6, 12o N. E. at 200, per Cardozo, J., "A tort committed
in one state creates a right of action that may be sued upon in another unless
public policy forbids." Spokane Inland R. R. v. Whitney, 237 U. S. 487, 494,
35 Sup. Ct. 655, (1914) : ". . the right to recover damages for the killing
of the decedent was created by the Idaho statute. That right could be en-
forced in another state, . . . but, wherever enforced, the liability sprung
from the Idaho law and was governed by it."
14 Fed. 53 (D- C. S. D. N. Y. 1882).
m Supra note 14.
Ibid. at 307.
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differ from the maritime law as understood in the country of the
forum; for as respects the parties concerned, it is the maritime law
which they mutually acknowledge." Thus, the rule concerning the
application of the United States limited liability statutes laid down
in The Scotland has become the well settled rule in cases of collision
on the high seas, between vessels of different nations, and is appli-
cable whether the one seeking the aid of the statutes is American
or foreign.
2
The doctrine is carried to its extreme, however, in the case of
The Titanic.22  In that case, the Steamship Titanic, Gf British reg-
istry and ownership, due to negligent navigation, but without fault on
the part of the owners, collided with an iceberg on the high seas and
sank. Actions for loss of life and property were instituted in the
federal courts, totalling millions of dollars. If the American rule
of limitation of liability were to be applied, the recovery would be
limited to the value of the ship saved, which consisted of several life-
boats. 24 If the British statute for limitation of liability were to be
applied, there would be a fund applicable for recovery, equal in
value to the estimated value of the ship immediately prior to the dis-
aster.25 The Supreme Court held that the law of the United States
applied. Mr. Justice Holmes in delivering the opinion of the Court,
admits "that the Act of Congress does not control or profess to
control the conduct of a British ship on the high seas" and that "it is
true that the foundation for recovery upon a British tort is an obliga-
tion created by British law," but adds, "it is also true that the laws of
the forum may decline altogether to enforce that obligation on the
ground that it is contrary to the domestic policy, or may decline to
enforce it except within such limits as it may impose." And, fur-
ther, the Court says, "A law that limits a right in one case may limit
a remedy in another." If full effect be given the decision and lan-
guage, its result is to say British law gives the right and our statute
limits the remedy. However, what becomes of Mr. Justice Bradley's
theory in the cases of The Belgenland and The Scotland? 2a Mr. Jus-
tice McKenna in The Titanic also considered it a proper deduction
from The Scotland that the law of the foreign country should be
enforced in respect to the amount of the owner's liability. This sit-
raThe Chattahoochee, 173 U. S. 540, 19 Sup. Ct. 491 (1898); La Bour-
gogne, supra note 14.
= 233 U. S. 718, 34 Sup. Ct. 754 (1914). Oceanic Steamship Co. as owners
of the Titanic v. Mellor.
21 City of Norwich, 118 U. S. 468, 6 Sup. Ct. 1I1O (1886); 46 U. S. C.
§ 182 supra note I.
MERCHANT SHIPPING ACTS (1894) s. 503; (19o6) s. 69; (907) s. I; The
John McIntyre, 6 P. D. 2oo (1881).
The Scotland, supra note 14, at 29: ". . . but if the contesting vessels
belonged to the same foreign nation, the court would assume that they were
subject to the law of their nation carried under their common flag, and would
determine the controversy accordingly."
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uation is the clearest type of case referred to by the dictum in The
Scotland, the case where there is only one nation involved, and a
nation which has a limited liability statute of its own which pur-
ports to cover this very situation.
This decision is in the same court which, just seven years be-
fore decided The Hamilton 27 in which a collision -on the high seas,
between two American vessels owned by Delaware corporations, re-
sulted in the death of sailors aboard the one vessel that sank. Mr.
Justice Holmes, who also delivered the opinion in this case, held that
the Delaware statute governs the right to sue for wrongful death
occurring aboard the sunken vessel, it being also at fault, but that
the Harter Act 21 limiting liability did not apply "even if its terms
could be extended to personal injuries or loss of life." Why does not
the Act limiting liability apply to an American ship on the high seas,
assuming that it would apply to loss of life? If the statute is a
procedural one, then the statute of Delaware giving the right of
action is to be modified by the statute binding on the forum in this
matter of procedure .2  This view is necessary if Mr. Justice
Holmes' analysis of the situation in The Titanic is accepted and it
is considered that The Hamilton is wrongly decided or that the Su-
preme Court departed from its original view.
So, in La Bourgogne,0 Mr. Justice White assumes, without
discussing the reasons therefor, that the French owners are entitled
to the protection of the United States limited liability statutes, and
proceeds to apply them. Yet this case, too, was one in which actions
were brought for loss of life, under the provisions of Le Code
Napoleon.3 1 The cause of action was held to be determined by the
lex loci delicti; 2 the limitation of liability was held to be governed
by our statutes. There is no difference between the two cases, except
that the argument is stronger in The Hamilton for limited liability,
in that both vessels are of American registry, and it cannot be as-
sumed under proper constitutional construction that the act of Dela-
ware is to limit any procedure of the federal court (Mr. Justice
Holmes' view in The Titanic being that limitation is procedural).
In La Bourgogne, the vessel was French, and death occurred thereon,
but the Napoleonic Code provides for full damages.3
"207 U. S. 398, 28 Sup. Ct. 133 (19o7).
'Feb. 13, 1893, c. 105, § 3, 27 Stat. 445.
'BEAr., op. cit. supra note 7, § 164. "The affording of a remedial right
* is a matter solely to be determined by the sovereign from whom the
remedy is demanded"; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 93.
'Supra note 14.
'ILE CODE NAPOLEON, Art. 1382.
I See supra note I.
'LE CODE NAPOLEON, Art. 1382: "Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui
cause a autrui un dommage, oblige celui par le faute duquel il est arrive a le
reparer."
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The theory is put to its most severe test in Royal Mail Steam
Packet Co. v. Companhia, etc.34 In this case the Brazilian ship A. J.
collided with the British Silarus in Belgian territorial waters. The
Brazilian ship, which had been negligently navigated, pleaded the
Belgian limited liability statute. The law of Belgium also fixes
the liability in proportion to fault. The District Court held that the
apportionment of damages, i. e., "the measure, elements, and extent
of the damages given by the lex loci," (in this case Belgium since
the collision occurred in Belgian territorial waters) 35 "pertain to the
substance of the right, not to the remedy," and "while the rights and
liabilities of the parties will be determined in accordance with the
law of the foreign country, the right to limit liability will be con-
trolled by the limited liability statute of our country. The Limited
Liability Act of the United States 31 does not impose, but only limits,
an existing liability, and is not a part of the general maritime law,
but is a declaraton of general policy of the United States for the
administration of justice in maritime cases. It relates not to the
right or liability, but to the remedy, and that is governed by the law
of the forum."
The court clearly defines the view of the Statutes, calling them
remedial, and therefore of the forum. But the distinction between
the mode of proportioning damages and the limitation of liability
seems very artificial. If the one is procedural or remedial, certainly
the other is. Respondeat superior is a rule of substantive law,"7
and the awarding of punitive damages is just as much a rule of sub-
stantive law. The limitation of liability under our statutes impairs
the doctrine of respondeat superior and gives a substituted lia-
bility, the liability of the ship. Wherein is the difference between
the proportionment of amount of damage which the owner must
pay and a rule which limits the amount the owner must pay?
The first is a qualification reducing the common law liability of joint
tortfeasors in much the same way that the limited liability statutes
reduce the common law liability of the master for the torts of his
servant committed within the scope of his authority. It would there-
fore seem that the limitation of liability is a substantive right-a
matter of defense.
Under the common law rule of conflict of laws of the federal
courts whereby the lex loci delicti governs to determine the existence
of the wrong,3 it is also the rule that "when a person recovers in one
31 Fed. (2d) 757 (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1928).
'Smith v. Condry, 42 U. S. 28 (1843) ; Manchester v. Mass., 139 U. S.
240, II Sup. Ct. 559 (1891); WESTLAKE, PRIVATE INT. LAW (7th ed. 1925)
§ 196; JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
(927) 116 et seq.
'046 U. S. C. A. 181-195.
'The M. Moxham, I P. D. 107 (1876).
'Herrick v. R. R., supra note 6, at 13, 16 N. W. at 413: "The statute of
another state has, of course, no extraterritorial force, but rights acquired under
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jurisdiction for a tort committed in another, he does so on the ground
of an obligation incurred at the place of the tort . . . and that is
not only the ground but the measure of the maximum recovery." 39
The court in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown says "the in-
justice of imposing a greater liability than that created by the law
governing the conduct of the parties at the time of the act or omis-
sion complained of is obvious." 40 Under this rule, limitation of lia-
bility is more than a mere matter of procedure, and becomes part
of the substantive right which is to be governed by the lex loci de-
licti, and it is not enough to contravene the public policy of the forum
that there is a different statute in the forum.41 The right to damages
is not a remedial right, since it is based on the destruction of a right,
and "concerns the sovereign within whose dominion the act was done;
that is, the place of the wrong . . creates the right to redress." 42
From the foregoing principles, it would seem, therefore, that limi-
tation of liability should be applied as the substantive law of the
locus delicti in all cases, and in order to determine whether limita-
tion of liability is to be granted, the petitioner must show that by the
lex loci delicti he is entitled to limitation. Then, if he is so entitled,
the statute of that jurisdiction, if proved, and not the United States
Statute, should be applied.43
Abralrnt Marcu.
Gowen Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
it will always, in comity, be enforced, if not against the public policy of the
laws of the former. In such cases the law of the place where the right was
acquired, or the liability was incurred, will govern as to the right of action;
while all that pertains merely to the remedy will be controlled by the law of
the state where the action is brought . . . whether the right of action be
ex contractu or ex delicto. . . . But it by no means follows that because
the Statute of one state differs from the law of another state, that therefore
it would be held contrary to the policy of the laws of the latter state," affirming
the judgment of court below which held the right to recover and the limit of
amount recoverable are governed by lex loci, not lex fori." Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Hill, 163 Ala. 18, 33, 50 So. 248, 256 (i9o9): "We also think that
the great weight of authority supports the proposition that where a tort is
committed in one state and sued on in another, the lex loci delicti governs,"
holding that where state in which breach occurred gives damages for mental
anguish, such damages will be given even though state in which contract was
made does not allow such damages.
" Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542. 34 Sup. Ct. 955 (913),
distinguishing The Titanic parenthetically, "A limitation oJ liability may stand
on different grounds."
o Supra note 39 Accord: Northern Pac. R. R. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190, 14
Sup. Ct. 978 (893); St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Brown, 67 Ark. 295, 54
S. W. 865 (i8go) ; SEDGwicK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) § 1373; MINOa, op. cit.
supra note 16: "The plaintiff should have the same substantial relief in the form
that he would be entitled to if he had sued in the locus delicti."
"Herrick v. R. R., supra note 38.
' BEALE, op. cit. sup-ra note 7, § 162.
' See supra note 18.
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RIGHT TO RECOVER COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED
UNDER A LOBBYING CONTRACT-Fundamental in any discussion of
lobbying contracts is the fact that our legislative bodies function in
a highly ramified civilization ' and consequently cannot be expected
to move sua sponte on all matters affecting their constituents.2 Some
method of lawfully promoting desired legislation must be permis-
sible; accordingly, no court has refused to enforce agreements stip-
ulating for purely professional services in procuring the passage or
defeat of legislative measures,3 it being immaterial whether the body
sought to be influenced be Congress, 4 state legislature 5 or municipal
council. 6  The language used in Trist v. Child 7 has become the
classic description of judicially acceptable services:
"We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all
other circumstances, an agreement express or implied for purely
professional services is valid. Within this category are included
drafting the petition to set forth the claim, attending to the tak-
ing of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and
submitting them orally or in writing, to a committee or other
proper authority, and other services of like character. All these
things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought
to be influenced. They rest on the same principles of ethics
as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are
no more exceptionable."
Naturally enough, the definition has scarcely precluded strenu-
ous court-room controversies over its applicability to the facts of the
particular case before the court,' the methods employed and upheld
'Aside from the question so often voiced: Is lobbying inherent in democ-
racy? another and entirely dissociated query might well be put: Is lobbying
the natural outgrowth of our present economic structure? The response of the
courts when confronted with contracts for such services, however, reveals them
to be actuated less by the economic than by the political aspects of the situation.
See Senator T. H. Caraway's radio address reported in New York Times, Nov.
75, 1929, at 14.
2 See argument of counsel in Trist v. Child, 88 U. S. 441 (1874).
2 Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548 (1876) ; State v. Okanogan County, 28o
Pac. 37 (Wash. 1929); Craw.ford v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 200 Cal. 318,
253 Pac. 726 (927).
IGalveston County v. Gresham, 220 S. W. 56o (Tex. Civ. App. I92O).
Dunlap v. Lebus, 112 Ky. 237, 65 S. W. 441 (9or).
'Barry v. Capen, I5i Mass. 99, 23 N. E. 735 (I89O).
7Supra note 2, at 450.
'Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana 366 (Ky. 1838) held an averment that legis-
lative acts were passed "at his instance and request! to import professional
services only; in Hunt v. Test, 8 Ala. 713 (1845), "to do all in his power" -as
held to be a stipulation for legitimate services. In Barry v. Capen, supra note
6, plaintiff, who was an attorney and also chairman of the Democratic City
Committee, agreed to and did advocate to the street commissioners the laying
out of a street through defendant's land, defendant telling him to "go and get
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ranging from drawing up technical plans and projects 9 to "bom-
barding" senators and congressmen with letters and "keeping in touch
with every person whose influence [plaintiff] deemed might be
useful in securing favorable action." 10 But more than one court has
balked at the rendering of even these services when they are per-
formed not before the legislature itself or some committee thereof
but before its individual members." These decisions adopt the
words of Powers v. Skinner:1"
"A person . . . cannot with propriety be employed . . .
to labor privately in any form with them, out of the legislative
halls, in favor of or against any act or subject of legislation.
The personal and private nature of the services to be rendered
is the point of illegality in this class of cases."
It is felt that the agent thus employed deprives the opponents of
the measure of a fair opportunity to meet his contentions. The view
thus taken seemingly ignores the fact that in the vast majority of
instances little or no opportunity is afforded interested persons to
appear before the legislative body or its committees; such courts
seem also to be unmindful of the necessary and reputable practices
of individual legislators listening, in their offices, to arguments of
those who might otherwise be unable even to have the measure intro-
as much as you can, and I will pay you $:ooo for it"; :n an opinion by Holmes,
J., the agreement was upheld. In State v. Okanogan County, supra note .3,
plaintiff, a civil engineer, recovered the agreed fee for submitting briefs, argu-
ments and data in support of a money claim by a county against the United
States, the court quoting the language of Trist v. Child, loc. cit. supra note 7,
with approval. See Meehan v. Parsons, 271 Ill. 546, 1i1 N. E. 529 (i9i6),
where it was held not against public policy for a city to pay its mayor's ex-
penses in securing Congressional appropriations for building costly levees;
cf. Kansas City Paper House v. Foley Ry. Printing Co., 85 Kan. 678, II8 Pac.
1056 (igii) where the agent was employed "simply as an ordinary salesman
whose efforts were confined to talking up the goods." The use of money to
influence legislation is not necessarily improper; it depends on the manner in
which it is used. Thus, if it is used to pay for the publication of circulars
or pamphlets, or other modes of collecting and distributing information openly
and publicly among the members of the legislature, the use is not objectionable.
See Kansas Pacific Ry. Co. v. McCoy, 8 Kan. 538, 543 (1871). Also, see
County v. Howard, 133 Va. i9, 62, 112 S. E. 876, 889 (1922), holding statute,
making a criminal offense "of paying money or other compensation to secure
the passage or defeat of any measure", to aim only at buying votes, bribery
and the like, and not at purely professional services.
'Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 U. S. 705, 34 Sup. Ct. 750 (1913).
"Herrick v. Barzee, 96 Ore. 357, i9o Pac. 141 (I92O), Bennett, J., in a
dissenting opinion, confuting the distinction between persuasion and influence
attempted in Stanton v. Embrey, supra note 3.
"Although this is stated to be the majority rule in 3 WILLISTON, CON-
T'RACTS (I920) § 1728, and elsewhere, it is a view to be found only in dicta,
especially in such cases as Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, 281 (i861), where the
individual advances are tainted.
Supra note ii, at 281.
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duced before the committee at all. The more practical view, allow-
ing individual solicitation, has received judicial sanction in other
courts,'" one 14 striking a compromise in declaring that such indi-
vidual approach might afford a reason for believing that illegal meth-
ods were pursued, but agrees that it does not of itself compel that
conclusion.
However, many a plaintiff, who has in all honesty contracted
for and performed admittedly proper services, has come into court
to recover his compensation only to find his contract eschewed as
contravening public policy because such compensation was to be
contingent upon the success of his efforts." The contingency of the
reward, maintain the courts adopting the so-called federal view,' 6 is
a strong incentive to the exercise of sinister methods, some even
going so far as to call such demoralization the necessary consequence
of this type of agreement. The contrary view is taken elsewhere, 17
and although we are not compelled to summon mathematics, as has
one court,' s to support the latter result, perhaps it is best to recog-
nize human frailty in the face of temptation and give due regard to
the stipulation, not, however, as conclusive of illegality but as a
signal for stricter scrutiny of the entire transaction. Generally, such
a provision has not been held to vitiate the analogous type of agree-
ments to procure public contracts, 19 the sweeping statement of an
early federal court, refusing to distinguish such contracts from those
'Foltz v. Cogswell, 86 Cal. 542, 25 Pac. 6o (18go); Herrick v. Barzee,
supra note 10; County v. Howard, supra note 8. See 3 WSLISTON, CONTRAcTS
§ 1728.
"Kansas &c. House v. Foley Ry. Printing Co., supra note 8.
Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315 (Pa. 1843), the court desiring
to exclude from the legislative halls a practice which is regretted existed
among the legal profession; Coquillard's Adm'r. v. Bearos, 21 Ind. 479 (1863)
(a strong case); Weed v. Black, 2 McArthur 268 (D. C. 1875). See Chip-
pewa &c. R. R. v. Chicago &c. R. R., infra note 33.
'The federal cases most frequently cited are Marshall v. B. & 0. R. R.,
57 U. S. 314 (853) ; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, 69 U. S. 45 (1864) ; and
Trist v. Child, supra note 2, in all of which lobbying methods were employed
in fact. See infra note 29. The federal view is that represented by the often
overlooked decisions in Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U. S. 252 (1875) ; Stanton v.
Embrey, supra note 3; Taylor v. Bemiss, 110 U. S. 42, 3 Sup. Ct. 441 (1883);
Valdes v. Larrinaga, supra note 9.
' Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, 74 Neb. 132, 103 N. W. 1053 (19o5) ; Anderson
v. Blair, 2o2 Ala. 209, 8o So. 31 (1918); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. 183,
246 S. W. 520 (1923), annotated in 29 A. L. R. 143 (1923) ; State v. Okanogan
County, supra note 3. As to the effect of the amount, see infra note 38.
"Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, supra note 17.
29 Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Botsford, 56 Kan. 532, 44 Pac. 3 (1896);
Warnock v. Phila. Trust Co., 69 Pa. Super. Ct. 589 (I918), distinguished
from Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, supra note 15; Dunham v. Hastings Paving
Co., 56 App. Div. 244, 67 N. Y. Supp. 632 (t9oo), followed in Beck v. Bauman,
187 App. Div. 774, 175 N. Y. Supp. 881 (1919); Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235
(1867) (a flagrant case).
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to influence legislation,20 having been later modified 21 to accord with
the prevalent view.
Human ingenuity renders far too remote the possibility of a
classic description of illegitimate means 22 for any attempt here to
be made in that direction, but the thoughts of some courts and the
testimony of some lobbyists are at least not unhelpful by way of
illustrating how their practices spread themselves all the way from
the page scurrying through the legislative halls to conciliating suppers
and direct bribes. Where improper influences have been employed
in the performance of an agreement legal on its face, the courts
without exception properly refuse judicial aid to the recovery of
compensation thereunder; 23 but rarely does their indignation fail to
let loose a flood of unearned dicta as to contingent compensation, the
"tendency" of such agreements, and the immateriality of whether
improper means were employed or contemplated, the court habit-
ually declaring the contract "void" as against public policy. Mani-
festly, their language is immeasurably colored by their knowledge
that lobbying tactics were employed in fact. Perhaps the better con-
ception of the refusal to grant compensation in such cases is not
that of illegality of contract, the terms of which expressly call for
professional services, but that of a legal contract the illegal perform-
ance of which fatally affects plaintiff's right to recover; for clearly,
if the agent had not performed, and then failed to interpose any
defense in an action by his employer on the contract, the latter would
be entitled to damages for breach of contract.2 4  If the words used
in the agreement served as a mere cover for the illegal consideration,
" Providence Tool Co. v. Norris, supra note 16, at 55.
'Valdes v. Larrinaga, supra note 9.
"Lobbying" seems to comprise within its meaning all methods of in-
fluencing public bodies to act or not to act upon a subject without reference to
its merits. See Trist v. Child, supra note 2, at 451; the opinion of that case
has been substantially embodied in TEX. REv. Cum. STAT. (0925) art. 179, 18o,
18I. Also, see Spalding v. Ewing,* 149 Pa. 375, 24 Atl. 219 (1892). Senator
Caraway, supra note i, offers an interesting classification.
= Spalding v. Ewing, supra note 22, where the court clearly believed, even
without actual proof, that improper tactics had been employed in "overcoming
the resistance of the post-office authorities"; Hyland v. Oregon Paving Co.,
74 Ore. 1, 144 Pac. 116o (914), where the agent circulated petitions among
the city's property owners, persuaded them to appear before street committees
and council, and fought remonstrances to procure an ordinance authorizing
paving; Adams v. East Boston Co., 236 Mass. 121, 127 N. E. 628 (1920), where
the agents, to effect a sale of marsh lands to the state, systematically secured
the pre-election p!edges of members-elect of the legislature to support a bill
authorizing such taking and to vote for a speaker favorable to the purchase,
the opinion rendered violently condemning the subserving of private interests
under any guise; cf. Flynn v. Bank, 53 Tex. Civ. App 482, u8 S. W. 848
(igogI), where no recovery was allowed even though the agreement was "to use
his best efforts by all rightful and legal means": Crocker v. United States, 240
U. S. 74, 36 Sup. Ct. 245 (1915) ; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris. supra note
i6; Hayward v. Nordberg Mfg. Co., 85 Fed. 4 (C. C. A. 6th, i898).
'4Cole v. Brown-Hurley Co., I39 Iowa 487, 117 N. W. 746 (i9o8).
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the contract is treated as illegal,2 5 the manner of performance being
evidence of what was actually contemplated, 26 but not being conclu-
sive, inasmuch as an illegal performance of almost any contract is
possible.2 Where the contract is ambiguous, s the performance
should, a forlioti, be evidence of what was intended. Where the-
terms clearly require ante-room strategy, the contract is properly
held to contravene public welfare, although here again there is to
be found lax talk of contingency of reward and corrupting "tend-
ency." 20 The presumption is that professional services are intended
and performed, with the burden on the employer to prove other-
wise ;30 on the other hand, it has been arbitrarily said that where the
language of the contract is broad enough to cover professional and
lobbying methods, the law will pronounce a ban on the paper itself.31
When the court condemns the entire transaction, it leaves the par-
ties where it finds them, whether the defense of lobbying is pleaded
or not .
2
Goodrich v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 16I Minn. io6, :2oi N. W.
290 (1924), agreement by mayor, majority of city council and some private
persons to "use all reasonable means to prevent telephone agitation in the city",
it being understood that personal influence would be used, where necessary, to
prevent a concession to a competing telephone company.
'See Barry v. Capen, supra note 6, at 100, 23 N. E., at 736; Dunham v.
Hastings Paving Co., supra note 19, at 248, 67 N. Y. Supp., at 634.
2 See Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, supra note 17. It is perhaps the extreme
obviousness of this which has led to its apparent judicial oversight in this
general class of cases.
= Knut v. Nutt, 83 Miss. 365, 371, 35 So. 686, 687 (1903), upholding an
agreement to prosecute a private money claim against the United States
"through such diplomnatic negotiations as may be deemed best by him for inter-
ests" of his client.
'Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb. 361 (N. Y. i855), agreement "to use his influ-
ence, efforts and labor"; Bermudez Asphalt Paving Co. v. Critchfield, 62 Ill.
App. 221 (1895), contract "to aid in the election of officials or in any other
matter pertaining to promotion of [defendant's] paving business with the
city"; Veazey v. Allen, 173 N. Y. 359, 66 N. E. 103 (1903), agreement to pro-
cure legislative investigation into "Whisky Trust" for purpose of depreciating
market value of its stock, plaintiff to receive half of the profits from selling
short and covering at the anticipated decline; Drake v. Lauer, 93 App. Div. 86,
86 N. Y. Supp. 986 (1904), agreement by professional lobbyist to secure
,for firm certain engineering information not open to other bidders; Marshall
v. B. & 0. R. R., siepra note I6, obtaining railroad charter by employing secret
agents; Trist v. Child, supra note 2, at 451; Powers v. Skinner, supra note Ii.
Contra: Lyon v. Mitchell, supra note 19; Stoner v. Stehm, 200 Iowa 8o9, 202
N. W. 530 (i925), agreement to use personal influence to settle claim against
municipality. In Sussman v. Porter, 137 Fed. I6I (C. C. D. N. J. I9o5), the
court distrusted a stipulation to render an account of "expenses," and held
the agreement void on demurrer.
' Salinas v. Stillman, 66 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 5th, 1894). Balanced against
this legal presumption, however, is the court's awareness of the often extreme
difficulty of proof.
See Hyland v. Oregon Paving Co., supra note 23, at I8, but it should
be noted that improper means were in fact employed; cf. Hunt v. Test, supra
note 8, in which the same stipulation "to do all in his power" received an entirely
opposite construction.
22Goodrich v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., supra note 25.
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Despite the oft-reiterated dictum of Trist v. Child to the sup-
posedly broad effect that the character of the agent employed is im-
material, the fact that he is "on the list" in lobby circles should
clearly be an element in considering what type of services were
intended,3 but the mere fact of political 3- or personal 35 association
should not be conclusive against him, though a doubt is natural. It
seems that the character of the one who hires does affect the court's
decision where the employer is itself a legislative body,8  for it is
deemed capable of determining for itself what the public policy is
to be. Although counsel for the ill-faring lobbyist sometimes seeks
to create a distinction between the seeking of public and that of pri-
vate acts of legislation, the courts have very properly brushed it
aside,3 7 a result justified by the realization that in either situation
the essential goal sought is the securing of public sanction. The
fraudulent character of the claim which the agent aims to impress
upon the legislators does, however, greatly affect his right of recov-
ery,38 despite the statements of some courts. The propriety of such
'Drake v. Lauer, supra note 29. Cf. Chippewa &c. R. R. v. Chicago &c.
R. R., 75 Wis. 224, 44 N. W. 17 (1889), agreement by railroad to render"reasonable and proper services" in procuring a land grant held necessarily a
'lobbying contract (even though there was no evidence of undue influences
having been exerted), the court stressing the non-professional character of the
person rendering the services; McCallum v. Corn Products Co., 131 App. Div.
617, 116 N. Y. Supp. 118 (io9) (plaintiff hired "only because he was a Jersey
man and knew some officials at Trenton").
"Barry v. Capen, supra note 8, (agreement by chairman of Democratic
City Committee upheld). In Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261 (188o)
the right to recover compensation for personal influences exerted by a foreign
consul to secure a firearms contract with a foreign government denied.
Southard v. Boyd, 51 N. Y. I77 (1872), recovery of 5% agreed fee for
securing o.f ship charter from government by ship-brokers, one of whom was
a son and another the son-in-law of the government agent who selected the
vessel, granted; cf. Elkhart County Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238 (1884) (im-
proper influences employed in fact).
'David v. Commonwealth, 164 Mass. 241, 43 N. E. 292 (3895). To be
distinguished from the true lobbying contract cases are those in which the
agreement is set aside on the ground of the hiring body's lack of statutory
power. Miller County &c. v. Cook, 134 Ark. 328, 204 S. W. 42o (i9i8);
State v. Bell, 124 Wash. 647, 215 Pac. 326 (1923). It is on such a ground that
the general problem of contracts to influence legislation has been decided in
England. MacGregor v. Dover &c. R. R., 18 Q. B. 618 (1852) ; Taylor v.
Chichester & M. R. R., L. R. 4 H. L. 649 (1870).
37Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, supra note 15.
' Usher v. McBratney, Fed. Cas. No. 16,8o5, at p. 853 (C. C. D. Kan.
1874) (preventing a legislative investigation into the affairs of a railway cor-
poration) ; Houtton v. Dunn, 6o Minn. 26, 6i N. W. 698 (0895) (obtaining
for $2500 government land worth $I2,OOO) ; Hazelton v. Sheckells, 2o2 U. S.
71, 26 Sup. Ct. 567 (igo5), distinguished in Valdes v. Larrinaga, supra note 9.
The "equitable" character of the claim is especially stressed in State v. Okan-
ogan County, supra note 3, but it is only with some difficulty that a fee of 5o7o
can be reconciled with the court's opinion. Taylor v. Bemiss, supra note 16,
seems to be the only decision recognizing the amount of the fee as indicating
fraud.
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a test may well be doubted, the justness of the claim being primarily
an issue to be determined not by the court but by the legislature. But
a sober refutation to this contention is perhaps found in the fact
that the court seeks not to set itself up as a final board of assessors
or tariff-makers but to fulfill its function of protecting the body
politic by placing about its representatives the best shield it has at
its disposal. It has been said that it is of no matter that actual bene-
fit and not harm results to the public,39 but these cases overlook the
true nature of the evil guarded against, namely, the tainted imposi-
tion of private views upon the legislature.
The language of Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co.,4
to the effect that, unless the hired advocate discloses the existence
of his employment to the body before which he pleads, he practices
a fraud upon them, has been universally approved,41 even being
substantially embodied in many statutes. 42  Well may it be asked,
however, as to how the advocatory character of the agent affects the
validity of his argument. Where the agent has a direct pecuniary
interest in the measure beyond that of mere employment, it is usually
stated that such interest must be disclosed.43 Although compensa-
tion may be recovered for professional services, yet where they are
blended with lobbying practices the court will refuse to sift them.
44
The overwhelming mass of dicta has clearly effected much
confusion as to the precise status of contracts to influence legislation,
but the courts have revealed unmistakably their attitude towards such
agreements. While contracts to influence purely extra-legislative,
although public, bodies and conference groups have not come within
the scope of past decisions, there seems to be no reason why the
salutary rule, so often applied to picayune claims, should not be ex-
tended to embrace situations involving not merely national but also
international well-being.
M.G.
THE POWER OF AN EXECUTIVE TO CONSTRUE STATUTES PER-
TAINING TO His DEPARTMENT AS A REASON FOR DENYING MAN-
DAmus-The law of mandamus has been well settled by a long
series of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States.' The
'Adams v. East Boston Co., supra note 23, at 128, 127 N. E., at 631
(dock sites) ; Veazey v. Allen, supra note 29 (investigation into manufacture
of whisky).
,oSupra note 16, at 335.
41 Stroemer v. Van Orsdel, supra note 17; Foltz v. Cogswell, supra note 13.
"N. Y. ANN. CONs. LAWS (2d ed. 1917) c. 32, § 66; Wis. REv. STAT.
(ig1) c. 183, § 4482.
"Miles v. Thorne, 38 Cal. 335 (1869) (plaintiff to receive share of tolls
after franchise obtained).
"Trist v. Child, supra note 2; Rose v. Truax, supra note 29.
'Beginning with Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (U. S. 18o3) and
Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524 (U. S. 1838).
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decisions have firmly established the doctrine that the writ of man-
damus will be issued to compel the performance of a ministerial
duty by theofficial 2 but that it will be refused when the duty re-
quired of him involves the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial dis-
cretion.3  The only difficulty in any given case is the application of
the doctrine and the determination of the question whether the act
of which the performance is sought is of a ministerial or of a judi-
cial character.4  Where a statute expressly vests the executive with
discretion, 5 or clearly implies that he is to act according to his judg-
ment,6 the solution is simple enough. In one situation, however, the
courts say that the executive has discretion though there is nothing
expressed in the statute concerning such discretion, nor is there
anything in the statute from which it may be implied. This situation
is where the executive acts according to his own construction of an
ambiguous statute,7 and a mandamus is sought to compel him to act
according to a possible alternative construction. The courts, in such
a case, often declare that the executive is vested with discretion in
interpreting ambiguous statutes relating to his department.
2United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378 (i88o) ; United States v. Mac-
Veagh, 234 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556 (i9o9) ; Ballinger v. United States, 216
U. S. 240, 30 Sup. Ct. 338 (igio) ; In re Stewart, 155 N. Y. 545, 5o N. E. 5i
(1898) ; also both cases supra note i.
3 United States v. Seaman, 17 How. 225 (U. S. 1854) ; United States v.
Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 698 (19o3) ; United States v. Lane, 250
U. S. 549, 40 Sup. Ct. 33 (919).
'As stated by Peckham, J., in Roberts v. United States, 176 U. S. 221, :29,
20 Sup. Ct. 376, 379 (igoo) : "The law relating to mandamus against a public
officer is well settled in the abstract, the only doubt which arises being whether
the facts regarding any particular case bring it within the law which permits
the writ to issue where a mere ministerial duty is imposed upon an executive
officer, which duty he is bound to perform without any further question. If
he refuse under such circumstances, mandamus will lie to compel him to perform
his duty."
6 United States v. Blaine, 139 U. S. 3o6, II Sup. Ct. 607 (1891) ; Lane v.
United States, 241 U. S. 2oi, 36 Sup. Ct. 599 (igi6).
'In People ex rel. Sheppard v. Illinois State Board of Dental Examiners,
iio Ill. i8o (1884), where the defendant board was required by statute to issue
licenses to practice dentistry to graduates of "reputable" dental schools, it was
held that it was within the discretion of the board to determine which dental
schools were "reputable" and mandamus was refused. Thus a mandamus was
also refused on the same ground where a statute authorized a medical exam-
ining board to refuse a certificate to an applicant who had been guilty of
"unprofessional and dishonorable conduct" and the relator was refused a cer-
tificate because of such misconduct, State ex rel. Powell v. State Medical Ex-
amining Board, 32 Minn. 324 (1884) ; and where a charter board was given
charge of awarding contracts to the lowest "reliable and responsible" bidder,
Kelly v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 279 (1871).
' Or in the closely analogous situations where there are two statutes each
apparently clear, but together they create an ambiguity, as in Decatur v. Pauld-
ing, infra note 8; or where the statute is apparently very clear, but a peculiar
situation arises which may or may not come within the statute depending on
what interpretation is given it, as in cases cited infra note i9.
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Decatur v. Paulding,8 decided in 184o, was the first case in
which the situation was squarely met by the Court. The Court there
held that the head of an executive departmex.may-..ercise his dis-
cretionin construing the statutes under which he is to act. The
broad proposition thus laid down in this and many other cases which
followed it 9 was somewhat qualified by the case of Roberts v. United
States,"0 decided sixty years later, which restricted the doctrine to
situations where the Court itself found the statute to be ambigu-
ous. In the course of the opinion the Court, speaking through Peck-
ham, J., said:
"Every statute to some extent requires construction by the
public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer
must read the law, and must therefore, in a certain sense, con-
strue it, in order to form a judgment from its language what
duty he is directed by statute to perform. But that does not
necessarily and in all cases make the duty anything other than
a purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an
act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and
which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then
that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute, which
requires, in some degree, a construction of its language by the
officer." 't
Apparently the Court felt the executive was abusing his discretion
8 39 U. S. 497. In this case, Congress had passed a general pension act and
had adopted a resolution the same day granting a specific pension to Mrs.
Decatur. Mrs. Decatur claimed under both the general act and the resolution,
but the Secretary of the Navy, who was trustee of the naval pension fund, held
that she had to elect to take either under the general act or under the resolu-
tion but she could not claim under both. Having taken under the general act,
Mrs. Decatur sought a mandamus to compel the Secretary to pay her the
pension provided by the resolution. Mandamus was refused. M'Lean, Story
and Baldwin, JJ., dissented, taking the view that the executive had no discretion
to interpret the statutes pertaining to his department.
'Commissioner of Patents v. Whiteley, 4 Wall. 552 (U. S. 1866) ; United
States ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40, 9 Sup. Ct 12 (x888); Riverside
Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 698 (1903) ; United States ex
rel. Ness v. Fisher, 223 U. S. 683, 23 Sup. Ct. 698 (1912) ; American Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Fyler, 6o Conn. 448, 22 At!. 494 (189
i . But see People ex reL.
Best v. Preston, 62 Hun. 185, igo, 16 N. Y. Supp. 488, 491 (i89r).
1o 176 U. S. 221, 20 Sup. Ct. 376 (igoo). Herc, certain certificates had
been issued to the assignor of the relator on which the relator was forced to
sue in order to secure their payment. Later a statute was enacted providing
for the payment of a certain rate of interest to those who had owned and re-
deemed such certificates. The Treasurer of the United States ruled that the
relator did not come within the statute on the ground that he had not redeemed
the certificates but had merely secured payment of a judgment in a cause of
action based on the certificates. The court held that the certificates had been
"redeemed" within the meaning of the act, and that mandamus would lie since
the construction of the statute was "plain and unmistakable".
"' Supra note io, at 231, 20 Sup. Ct. at 379.
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by refusing to perform a duty plainly devolved upon him by statute
on the ground that he construed the statute otherwise. It is a gen-
eral rule that mandamus lies where an executive, having discretion,
abuses that discretion. 12
The construction of a statute pertaining to executive depart-
ments is often involved in other than mandamus cases, and in these
cases the courts are inclined to give an ambiguous statute the same
construction as the executive department, providing the departmental
interpretation has been uniform and consistent over a long period
of time. 13. Here, however, the discretion of the official in constru-
ing the statute is not involved, because (i) the court is not bound
by the particular construction given by the executive, and (2) the
interpretation must have been continued for a long time or the court
will not give it weight.'- If it were a matter of discretion, each new
incoming official could interpret all the acts pertaining to his de-
partment for himself. The rule seems a practical one based on
public policy.15
Thus there is a plain distinction between the cases where an
executive interpretation arises in a suit against the government, or
between private parties, and where it arises in a mandamus action
against the executive himself. Chief Justice Taney in Decatur v.
Paulding said:
"If a suit should come before this Court, which involved
the construction of any of these laws, the Court certainly would
'Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 (U. S. 1824); People v. Brady, 268 Ill.
192, io8 N. E. ioo9 (1915) ; Uszkay v. Dill, 92 N. J. L. 327, ic6 Atl. 17 (1919) ;
People v. Robinson, 141 App. Div. 656, 126 N. Y. Supp. 546 (igio). Contra:
Shotwell v. Covington, 69 Miss. 735, 12 So. 260 (iS92).
'Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 62 U. S. 35 (I858); Robertson v. Downing, 127
U. S. 6o7, 8 Sup. Ct. 1328 (1888); United States v. Alabama, G. S. R. R., 142
U. S. 615, 12 Sup. Ct. 3o6 (1892); United States v. Tanner, 147 U. S. 661, 13
Sup. Ct. 436 (1893) ; Webster v. Luther, 163 U. S. 331, 16 Sup. Ct. 963 (i896) ;
United States v. Cerecedo Hernanos y Compania, 209 U. S. 337, 28 Sup. Ct.
532 (1908).
"It is but a step away from this situation to that where the public gen-
erally has accepted a certain construction of an ambiguous statute. Under
such circumstances, it is held that common usage and practice under the statute
for a long period of time will greatly influence the courts in construing the
statute likewise. McKeen v. Delancey, 5 Cranch 22 (U. S. 18og) ; Rogers v.
Goodwin, 2 Mass. 475 (1807) ; Packard v. Richardson, 17 Mass. 121 (1821).
" In Rogers v. Goodwin, supra note 14, at 477, the court said: "Were the
Court now to decide that this construction is not to be supported, very great
mischief would follow. And although, if it were now res integra, it might be
very difficult to maintain such a construction, yet at this day the argumentum
ab inconvenienti applies with great weight. We cannot shake a principle which
in practice has so long and so extensively prevailed. If the practice originated
in error, yet the error is now so common that it must have the force of law.
The legal ground on which this provision is now supported is, that long and
continued usage furnishes contemporaneous construction, which must prevail
over the mere technical import of the words."
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not be bound to adopt the construction given by the head of a
department." "I
But if the party bringing the suit is so unfortunate that his only
remedy, if any exists at all, is mandamus, the rule seems harsh. It
leaves the interpretation of a statute, which is a judicial function, to
an individual usually untrained in the law. True, the executive may
resort to the Attorney-General for advice, but he need not do so, and
if he does, he is not bound to follow the advice given him. More-
over, the rule enables each new incoming executive to construe a
statute in a different manner from that of his predecessor in the
same office.' 7  In Houghton v. Papie18 the Postmaster-General
changed the departmental construction of a statute which had been
followed for sixteen years.
To say that the legislative body intended an official to act
according to his own construction of a statute which is ambiguous
on its face is almost to impute an intent to that body to enact an
ambiguous statute. Of course, there are many cases where it must
be determined whether the statute was intended to apply to a par-
ticular set of facts, and in reaching a conclusion, an interpretation
of the statute may necessarily be involved.' 9 In such a case, the
argument against holding that the legislative body intended that the
executive should interpret the statute to determine whether it applied
to the particular set of facts is not so strong since every particular
case which might arise could not be provided for in the act. But if
there is discretion in interpretation under these circumstances, why
does the interpretation given by the executive not bind the courts
in an action other than mandamus? The answer apparently is that
the executive may act according to his own interpretation, but
whether rights exist depends upon a legal interpretation of the stat-
ute. However, where mandamus is the only remedy a party may
"Supra note 8, at 515.
"'In our system of government where changes of State officers are so
frequent, and where one political party may succeed another in a few years,
it is of great importance that there shall be no right in a new officer to reverse
the decisions of his predecessor. The contrary rule would, in our government,
be especially dangerous. And officers themselves should be protected from
the importunity of claimants in such cases; even where the claim is one against
the State itself". People ex -el. Best v. Preston, supra note 9, at 189.
1 194 U. S. 88, 24 Sup. Ct. 590 (i9o4). This was a bill in equity for an
injunction.
"As in Houghton v. Payne, supra note i8, where the question arose
whether paper bound editions of standard works of great authors issued quar-
terly were periodicals within the meaning of the statute; or as in United States
ex rel. Dunlap v. Black, supra note 9, where a statute was enacted increasing
the pensions of those individuals who had received $5o a month under a previous
statute and the question was whether the relator could apply for such increase
because he could have claimed under the statute allowing $5o a month, although
he had in fact claimed and had been receiving, under a different act, less than
he was entitled to.
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have, there is no way of enforcing those rights. It can hardly be
conceived that the legislathre intended to create rights capable of
being enjoyed only if the executive happened to reach a correct inter-
pretation, realizing that those who are to interpret are generally lack-
ing in the necessary legal training.
20
There is a tendency in the more recent cases to avoid the harsh
doctrine of Decatur v. Paulding through the medium of the rule in
Roberts v. United States-that is, by finding the statute which the
executive thought ambiguous, to be clear and explicit. Thus the
Court granted a mandamus in Work v. United States ex rel. McAles-
ter-Edwards Co.,2 decided in 1923, where the Court held that the
Secretary had no discretion to construe "appraised value" in a stat-
ute as referring to a new appraisement rather than to an appraisement
according to a statute enacted six years earlier. A mandamus was
also granted in Lane v. Hoglund,22 decided in 1917, where the Court
held that a report from a deputy forest supervisor recommending
cancellation of a land entry on account of non-residence and lack of
cultivation was not a "pending contest or protest" against the valid-
ity of such entry within the meaning of the statute and that the execu-
tive could not construe it as such. In Work v. United States ex rel.
Mosier,23 decided in 1923, the Court held that certain bonuses were
.'royalties" within the meaning of the statute in spite of a depart-
mental construction otherwise, but mandamus was refused on other
grounds. However, in Work v. United States ex rel. Rives, 24 de-
cided in 1925, the Secretary having held that the purchase of land
containing manganese by a manganese concern during the war was
"speculative" within the meaning of a statute which provided for
allowances of certain claims of private persons who had lost money
in the production of war materials owing to the Armistice, and ex-
cepting all investments for speculative purposes, mandamus was re-
fused on the ground that the Secretary could exercise his discretion
in construing the statute. The Court could easily have come to the
same decision on the ground of express discretion vested in the Sec-
retary since the statute provided that he was to make such adjust-
' "Whenever, in pursuance of the legislation of Congress, rights have
become vested it becomes the duty of the courts to see that those rights are not
disturbed by any action of an executive officer, even the Secretary of the In-
terior, the head of a department. However latidable may be the motives of
the Secretary, he, as all others, is bound by the provisions of Congressional
legislation." Ballinger v. United States, 216 U. S. 240, 249, 30 Sup. Ct. 338,
340 (909). See Noble v. Union River Logging R. R., 147 U. S. 165, 13 Sup.
Ct. 271 (1893), where the Secretary of the Interior was enjoined from re-
voking a decision of his predecessor which would have the effect of depriving
the plaintiff of vested rights.
. 262 U. S. 200, 43 Sup. Ct. 580.
2 244 U. S. 174, 37 Sup. Ct. 558.
= 261 U. S. 352, 43 Sup. Ct. 389. See also American School of Magnetic
Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S. 94, 23 Sup. Ct. 33 (1902); and Payne v.
United States ex rel. National Ry. Pub. Co., 2o App. D. C. 581 (1902).
267 U. S. I75, 45 Sup. Ct. 252.
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ments and payments in each case as he should determine to be just
and equitable, and the decision of the Secretary was to be conclu-
sive and final.
The explanation of the rule in Decatur v. Paulding is a his-
torical one-the reluctance of the judiciary to interfere with the
executive department in the exercise of the duties intrusted to it.2 5 It
is worthy of note that, while the principle of Kendall v. United
States,20 which allows a mandamus to issue against an executive where
purely ministerial duties are involved is well established today, when
that case was decided (1838) there were three dissenting justices,
one of which was Taney, C. J., who wrote the opinion in the Decatur
case. The rule thus stands as an example of a retarded development
in the law of mandamus.
W.N.M.
LIABILITY OF BAILORS AND OTHER SUPPLIERS OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY FOR INJURIES DUE TO DEFECTS-The recent decision of
Oliver v. Saddler & Co. "presents a cross-section of the liability to
which certain possessors of personal property may be subjected upon
transfer thereof. This case is significant because of the fact that it
intimates a departure from Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mdholland2 hith-
2"The position taken by the Court [in Decatur v. Paulding] . . . ap-
pears to reflect the view given weight and currency at the time by President
Jackson, that the executive and judicial departments have concurrent and inde-
pendent power to interpret the law in the regular course of their separate
duties." DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF THE
LAW (1927) 288.
"Supra note I.
"The effect of the decisions is thus, . . . they [the courts] will re-
verse for error of law only where they feel that the error is so gross as to be
beyond the bounds of reason. In other words, they will not substitute their
own opinion of the law for the legal opinion of the Land Department except
where they regard the latter's opinion as a rational impossibility. This result,
when so expressed, appears as a paradox. . . . The paradox vanishes if
we say that what the courts really do is to refuse to treat as matters for the
application of legal rules, or to lay down such rules to govern, many of the
details of procedure and even of classification and interpretation which they
properly prqfer to regard as the subject-matter for a body of technical ad-
mnistrative practice." DICKINSON, op. cit. supra note 25, at 286.
Chapman (the party's maiden name) or Oliver in the full title of the
case, according to Scottish practice. [1929] A. C. 584. In this case a firm of
stevedores and a porterage company were engaged in unloading bags of maize.
The stevedores' work consisted of depositing the bags on deck; from this
point they gratuitously permitted the porterage company to use their slings
which were already around the bags, the unloading being expedited thereby.
The stevedores employed an inspector on whom the porters were known to
rely. The court held that a duty was owed the porters to have the slings in fit
condition, certain distinctions existing between the case at bar and Caledonian
Ry. Co. v. Mulholland or Warwick, infra note 2.
2 [i898] A. C. 216. In this case the defendant railroad contracted with
a consignee to ship coal to a certain station, beyond which it gratuitously per-
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erto unquestioned as establishing the limit and extent of the liability
of one supplying articles for the use of others.
The mode of transfer involved in these cases is a bailment. A
fundamental proposition in the common law regards the rights and
duties arising out of bailments as founded upon the contemplation
of benefit accruing to the one party or to the other.3 It was early
decided that this factor determined the nature of the bailee's duty
with reference to his care for the chattel ;4 however, the conception
that a bailment created duties peculiar to itself gave rise to certain
inconsistencies later to be noticed.
It was established in Blakemore v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co.'
that a bailor, though he derive no benefit from the bailment, "must be
responsible for defects in the chattel with reference to the use for
which he knows the loan is accepted, of which he is aware, and owing
to which directly the borrower is injured." In examining the basis
and extent of this liability, it is clear that according to the Blakemiore
decision the duty is contractual. Though it is generally held that
a contract does exist 6 in such cases of gratuitous bailments, the better
view is otherwise. 7  Even under the view that a contract is present,
the duty does not necessarily depend upon the contract, but rather
upon the relation of the parties. The function of the contract being
merely to establish such relation, where the claim goes further to
aver a breach of duty arising out of that relationship the action is one
mitted a second railroad to haul the freight cars to the consignee's premises
under an arrangement to which the defendant was not party. It was held
that no duty was owed servants of the second railroad to have the cars in fit
condition. Followed in Kemp & Dougall v. Darngavil Coal Co., [igo9] Sess.
Cas. 1314. Bohlen, Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort (i9o5)
53 U. OF PA. L. REv. 2o9, 232, BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926)
33, 59.
' A bailment is the rightful possession of personal property by one who is
not the owner. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (924) § io32. The common law
concepts of bailment were derived from the civil law, which classified the types
of bailment mainly according to the nature of the transaction, such as keeping,
using, or carrying the chattels. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (1702).
The general classification, however, turns upon the factor of benefit: bailments
for the sole benefit of the bailee, bailments for the sole benefit of the bailor,
and bailments for the benefit of both parties. SCHOULm, BAIL.MENTS AND CAR-
RIERS (3rd ed. 1897) § 14.
" Coggs v. Bernard, supra note 3; see Hibernia Bldg. Ass'n v. McGrath, 154
Pa. 296, 304, 26 Atl. 377, 378 (1893) ; cf. The Steamboat New World v. King,
16 How. 469, 474 (U. S. 1853).
68 E. & B. 1035 (1859) ; Coughlin v. Gillison [1899] I Q. B. 145; Gagnon
v. Dane, 69 N. H. 264, 39 Atl. 982 (1897).
'Blakemore v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co., supra note 5 (regarding as con-
sideration the bailee's duty to care for the chattel); STORY, BAILMENTS (gth
ed. 1878) § 2, n. (regarding as consideration the bailee's duty to redeliver);
DoBIE, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (914) § 33.
*'2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1039 (the duties mentioned supra note 6 con-
sidered mere conditions qualifying the bailee's right of user).
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of tort.8 However, it is not necessary for a contract to establish the
relation from which the duty to disclose known defects arises. Where
a person consents to another's coming into contact with his property,
knowing that the other is unaware of its dangers, his conduct is
essentially misfeasance rather than nonfeasance. 9 That a contract
was regarded necessary arose out of the tendency of the times to re-
fer obligation to consent i°--yet it is clear that the same duty would
exist in cases of gifts where no contract could be alleged. The posi-
tion of a donee is closely analogous to that of a bailee in a bailment
which is gratuitous or for his sole benefit; the declaration of Cole-
ridge, J., in the Blakemore case, that the duty "is so consonant to
reason and justice that it cannot but be part of our law," is equally
applicable. The conclusion is further sustained by analogy to the
rights of a mere licensee on the land of another.'! Thus, the rela-
tion to which the law attaches the obligation to refrain from leading
another into known danger is not that of bailor and bailee, but rather
that of supplier and user, whether the transfer be by gift, license or
sale.
It is not unreasonable to require the gratuitous supplier of prop-
erty to use ordinary efforts to inform the other party of facts con-
cealment of which is likely to render use of the property dangerous.
Such supplier is not under duty to ascertain facts, but he must not
close his eyes to truth; he need not discover dangers, but it is suffi-
cient that from facts already within his knowledge he should know
danger to be probable.' Thus, more facts come to the knowledge of
a manufacturer, and though he make a gift of his product the recip-
ient is at least entitled to those facts. However, where the facts are
so available that a donee, without even looking the gift-horse in the
mouth, can acquire all the knowledge which would protect him, the
reason falls and with it the rule. On the other hand, where the sup-
plier believes that the recipient is incapable of understanding the grav-
ity of the danger, neither the availability nor the disclosure of the
facts should be sufficient to relieve him of liability. On the same prin-
ciple, even where the property is not defective, and the source of
danger is the incompetency of the user, the supplier who is aware
'Turner v. Stallibrass [1898] I Q. B. 56.
'See Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 370, 375 (1867) ("something like
fraud").
"Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk (19o6) 20 HARV. L. REv. 14, 32.
BoEiLE-, op. cit. supra note 2, 441, 464.
"The principle of law as to gifts is, that the giver is not responsible for
damage resulting from the insecurity of the thing, unless he' knew its evil
character at the time, and omitted to caution the donee." Gautret v. Egerton,
supra note 9; De Haven v. Hennessey Bros. & Evans Co., 137 Fed. 472 (C. C.
A. 6th, 19o5). Contra: Fitzpatrick v. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co., 61 N. J. L.
378, 39 Atl. 675 (1898). It appears inconsistent to place the duty to disclose
known defects upon a licensor of personalty, but not upon a licensor of realty.
"See Conn v. Hunsberger, 224 Pa. 154, 73 Atl. 324 (1909).
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of such incompetency cannot escape liability.1" In any event, the
duty being imposed by law apart from contract, the scope of the sup-
plier's liability depends on the extent of his negligence: he remains
liable for injuries of which the danger is in law the cause, to the re-
cipient, to users in his right, or to strangers whom he should foresee
as within the zone of the hazard he has created. Where he uses rea-
sonable efforts to disclose his knowledge of danger to the recipient,
he is ordinarily relieved of liability not only to the recipient, but also
to third persons subsequently injured; similarly, where the property
is accepted only for the use of a third party, unless the supplier has
reason to believe that the information will not be transferred, or the
property is incapable of safe use for any purpose, in which instances
his manifest duty is not to supply.
The particular question presented in Oliver v. Saddler & Co.
involved the further duty to inspect, as between bailor and bailee.
Where a bailor is benefited by the bailment, it is acknowledged that
his duties should be of a nature higher than in the case of a bail-
ment which solely benefits the bailee; such bailor is under obligation
to use reasonable efforts to anticipate dangers by discovering defects
which may exist in the chattel bailed. 4 The existence of a contract
in such case is unquestioned. 1 Therefore it was natural for courts
to include this obligation in an implied warranty to the effect that
the property be suitable for the purpose known to be intended.'
The nature of this duty, however, appears to be rendered uncertain by
the manner in which courts use the term "warranty": it has been
regarded as synonymous with "obligation," and has also been consid-
ered in terms of negligence.1 7 The Lord President, in Wood & Co. v.
Mackay,"' declared, "I will not use the word 'warranty,' in case it
may not be strictly accurate." The cases, in effect if not in language,
hold that a bailor benefited by the transaction is under duty to use
ordinary care to furnish a chattel reasonably safe. 9
'Gardiner v. Solomon, 20o Ala. 115, 75 So. 621 (1917) ; Crowell v. Dun-
can, 145 Va. 489, 134 S. E. 576 (1926).
" Gagnon v. Dane, supra note 5. That the liability discussed in this note
applies to property damage as well as to personal injuries, see Akers v. Over-
beck, 18 Misc. 198, 41 N. Y. Supp. 382 (1896).i2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1040.
leVogan & Co. v. Oulton, 8I L. T. R. 435 (1899); see In re Bliss Co., 250
N. Y. 410, 417, 165 N. E. 829, 832 (1929) and cases therein cited.
" See Searle v. Laverick, 43 L. J. Q. B. 43, 47 (1874). In Jones v.
Page, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122 (I867), Kelly, C. B., held that it was needless to con-
sider the abundant evidence of negligence, allowing recovery upon an implied
warranty. However, Piggott, B., held "I am of the same opinion . . . that,
as a letter out of a vehicle for hire he was bound to use proper and ordinary
care that it was reasonably fit and proper for the purpose."
[i9o6] Sess. Cas. 625.
"Moriarity v. Porter, 22 Misc. 536, 49 N. Y. Supp. 11o7 (1898) ; Conn
v. Hunsberger, supra note 12. Circumstances may require the utmost care. See
2 BEMN, NEGLIGEN CE (4th ed. 1928) 969 as to Hyman v. Nye, 6 Q. B. D. 688
(1881).
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Upon this phase of the problem it is most important to deter-
mine the true basis of liability, since violation of a duty to inspect
would constitute nonfeasance rather than misfeasance, and there is
no general duty to act for the protection of others.20 Even under
the theory of implied warranty, absence of a contract between the
supplier of the defective property and the person injured should
not necessarily defeat recovery. 21 However, especially where the
rights of injured third parties are involved, the courts have not relied
upon the implication of a warranty. The fact that the law was
able to shake off the influence of Winterbottom V. Wright,'2 cited
as controlling in the Blakeinore case, is further indicative of the con-
cept that a bailment created duties peculiar to itself. The issue of
privity was squarely faced in Elliott v. Hall: 2 "It is contended that
there is no duty because there was no contract with the plaintiff, but
the plaintiff was acting as the servant of the company with whom
the contract was made, and the defendant must have known that the
buyers would not unload the coal themselves and that their servants
would do so." But this was not to be the limit of liability, for in
White v. Steadmun,214 Lush, J., discussing Elliott v. Hall, states "I do
not think it matters that the plaintiff in that case was a person who
would necessarily to the defendant's knowledge use the truck. The
duty lies toward the persons or class of persons whom the owner
must be taken to contemplate may use the dangerous chattel . .. ."
This evolution of liability has erroneously remained peculiar to
the bailment relation in the majority of jurisdictions.2 5  There is a
distinction in law between a bailor and a manufacturer-vendor in that
the bailor still owns the property though he transfer possession, such
ownership entitling him to a degree of control over the chattel and
interesting him in its future use. However, the law of tort is more
concerned with physical probabilities than the law of property-and
once possession of property is transferred, actual ability to control
is lost whether the transfer be by bailment or sale. In any event, as
prerequisites to recovery, the use of the chattel must be the use for
which it was known to be intended, and the person using it must be
-doing so rightfully. It is submitted, therefore, that the jurisdictions
which allow a person other than the bailee to recover for injuries
20 RESTATEMNT OF THE LA w oF TORTS (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 192. See
Meux v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., [18951 2 Q. B. 387, 391.
' See Note (1929) 77 U. OF PA. L. REv. 388, 391.
io M. & W. 1O9 (1842).
2 15 Q. B. D. 315 (1885). The question of liability to a third party had
been raised in Young v. McCarthy, 6 H. & N. 329 (1861) but not decided. In
Heaven v. Pender, iI Q. B. D. 503 (1883), a servant of the bailee was allowed
recovery, the Blakemore case being distinguished.
2 [1913] 3 K. B. 340.
4 Earl v. Lubbock, 1905] i K. B. 253; cf. Elliott v. Hall, supra note 23.
Huset v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3);
cf. Coughlin v. The Rheola, ig Fed. 926 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1884); and then
note Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Car Co., 261 Fed. 878 (C. C. A. 2d, 1919).
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caused by defects which the bailor should have discovered, are incon-
sistent when they deny recovery to a person other than the purchaser
against a manufacturer-vendor.
The duty of a bailor, with reference to defects in the property
which he should recognize as likely to injure others, has the same
basis as other affirmative obligations-his derivation of benefit.28
Where the bailor has no more interest in the purposes of the bailment
than a donor, it is unreasonable to impose upon him a duty to put
the subject-matter in safe condition; this would unduly restrict the
transfer of property, causing persons to refrain from lending chat-
tels for another's purposes and from making gifts. On the other
hand, one receiving property or its use as a gift should not expect
the donor even to prepare it for him. However, where the bailor
is benefited by the transaction the situation is otherwise: he has a
reason to prepare the chattel for the expected purpose, and the bailee
is entitled to believe that it will be reasonably safe for such purpose.
A bailment may be of material benefit to the bailor, even though
gratuitous in that he derives no compensation in money.27  With
regard to the duty to inspect, the essential factor is that the benefit
have sufficient reference to the business purposes of the bailor to
place the bailee in the class of business guest.2 A most common
form of bailment which benefits both parties is that of hire; here it
is important to ascertain when the contract is at an end. The un-
loading of a freight car and the movements necessary thereto at the
point of delivery may be within the terms of the bailment ;2' but its
use beyond the point of delivery, though necessary to bring the
freight to the consignee's premises, may be a "new journey" in which
the bailor is unconcerned.3 ° Even though work is being performed
for the bailor by the bailee, property transferred from the one to
the other may be entirely for the business purposes of the bailee.31
The category in which each Law Lord placed the bailment in-
volved in Oliver v. Saddler & Co. may be determined by considering
certain language in and the substance of each opinion. Lord Buck-
master observed "It is. in the interests of everyone concerned in the
expeditious discharge of the cargo that these operations should be
continuous." However, he proceeded to distinguish the case at bar
from the Mulholland case upon the ground that "In that case exami-
'Bohlen, op. cit. supra note 2, 209 et seq., BOHLEN, 33 et seq.
"'The Steamboat New World v. King, supra note 4; ScHOULER, oP. cit.
supra note 3, § 91.
e' This is well discussed in the opinion of the Court of Sessions, Chapman
or Oliver v. Sadler & Co., [1928] Sess. Cas. 6o8, 616, but applied with ques-
tionable accuracy in referring to the Mulholland case and in considering the
instant situation "foreclosed" thereby.
Elliott v. Hall, supra note 23.
' Caledonian Ry. Co. v. Mulholland, supra note 2.
Young v. McCarthy, supra note 23. The twilight zone of this problem
appears to be reached where the benefit which accrues to the bailor is goodwill,
e. g., a gift may often be an advertisement.
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nation of the wagons was equally open to both persons by whom they
were used," rather than upon the presence of benefit to the bailor in
the instant situation. Lord Atkin declared "In these conditions the
rule as to gratuitous bailors appears to me to have no application."
Nevertheless, he did not regard this factor in distinguishing the
Mulholland case, "where it was unreasonable to maintain that there
was a duty to examine," from the principal case, "where the duty
to examine is recognized and relied on by both parties." This assump-
tion of the existence of a duty is clearly begging the question. Vis-
count Dunedin, adding his observations only "in case I should be
thought to be pushing the idea of the liability of the owner of the
defective chattel far further than I think it ought to be pushed,"
distinguished the cases on the ground that "in the present case the
use to which the chattel was being put was obviously dangerous,"
making no reference to the purposes of the bailment in either instance.
Thus, the issue is raised whether these distinctions would justify
any departure from the orthodox basis of liability-that a person is
under duty to use ordinary care to make property reasonably safe
for a use by another which benefits his own business purposes.
The first distinction, that the recipient of the property had no
opportunity to inspect it, cannot impose an affirmative obligation
upon a supplier. The bailee in a- transaction for his sole benefit is
under no duty to accept the property at all; if a donee-bailee is willing
to take it regardless of his inability to inspect, merely because the
benefits which accrue to him outweigh such disadvantage, this serving
of his own interests should hardly increase a donor-bailor's obliga-
tions. However, under the classical view, where the duty of the
bailor is determined by his derivation of benefit, the bailee's oppor-
tunity to inspect is a factor accorded the proper consideration: it is
a circumstance in determining whether the supplier has exercised due
care and whether the bailee is guilty of contributory fault. Even a
duty upon a third party to inspect should not relieve the supplier of
his obligation.32
Reliance upon the defendant's inspection, the distinction empha-
sized by Lord Atkin, is an element independent of any duty of a
supplier of property to inspect. Where the plaintiff, to the knowl-
edge of the defendant, relies upon the latter's gratuitous services
under circumstances which constitute an inducement that he do so
-although this may impose upon the defendant the duty to act with
care or to continue such services 3 3 -to regard such reliance as a dis-
"See Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 196 U. S.
217, 25 Sup. Ct. 226 (i9o5), which discusses the conflict in authority. That a
bailee has opportunity to inspect merely prevents recovery on the theory of
implied warranty. Gaffey v. Forgione & Romano, 126 Me. 220, 137 At. 244
(1927).
I Montgomery v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., I8I Mo. 477, 79 S. W. 930 (904);
see Loader v. London & India Joint Docks Committee, 8 T. L. R. 5 (IgI). It
is not to be inferred that the writer regards as gratuitous the services rendered
in the instant case.
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tinguishing issue between cases of bailment merely confuses the basis
of liability. Entirely unconnected with the duties attendant to the
present ownership and prior possession of property, it is less prop-
erly a distinction than a wholely separate theory of liability.
That the use of the chattel is "obviously" dangerous also pre-
sents no reason for disregarding the factor of benefit to the bailor
as the basis of his obligation to put the property in safe condition.
A perfect sling is no more dangerous than a perfect freight car; and
if either is defective persons within the area of use are subjected
to the risk of serious bodily harm. It would be unfortunate to bring
into the law another arbitrary distinction.3 4 Obvious danger is merely
a circumstance to consider in connection with the question whether
reasonable care has been exercised-once it is established that the
duty to exercise such care existed.
It is submitted, not out of reverence for settled principles, but
out of lack of conviction in the reasoning of Oliver v. Saddler &
Co., that in determining the liability of a bailor it is undesirable to
give merely incidental consideration to the nature of the benefit de-
rived from the bailment. It is hoped that this decision, which could
have rested upon the ground of benefit to the business interests of
both bailor and bailee, will serve not to confuse the true basis of lia-
bility where injuries are caused by defective chattels, but rather to
illustrate that it is in accord with natural justice to rest upon benefit
the affirmative obligations arising from possession of property.
H.P.
See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 389, IIi N. E. io5o,
1053 (i916) and citations therein, as to "inherently" dangerous manufactured
products.
